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Abstract We apply prospect theory to explain how per-
sonal and corporate bankruptcy laws affect risk percep-
tions of entrepreneurs at time of entry and therefore their
growth ambitions. Previous theories have reached am-
biguous conclusions as to whether countries with more
debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws (i.e. laws that are more
forgiving towards debtors in bankruptcy proceedings) are
likely to have more entrepreneurs, or whether, creditor-
friendly regimes have positive effects on new ventures
via enhanced incentives for the supply of credit to entre-
preneurs. Responding to this ambiguity, we apply pros-
pect theory to propose that entrepreneurs do not attach
the same significance to different elements of bankruptcy
codes—and to explain which aspects of debtor-friendly
bankruptcy laws matter more to entrepreneurs. Based on
this, we derive and confirm hypotheses about the impact
of aspects of bankruptcy codes on entrepreneurial activity
using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor combined
with data on both personal and corporate bankruptcy
regulations for 15 developed OECD countries. We use
multilevel random coefficient logistic regressions to take
account of the hierarchical nature of the data (country and
individual levels). Because entrepreneurs and creditors
are sensitive to different elements of the codes, there is
scope for optimisation of the legal design of bankruptcy
law to achieve both an adequate supply of credit and to
encourage high-ambition entrepreneurship.
Keywords Entrepreneurship . High-aspiration
entrepreneurship . Bankruptcy. Global entrepreneurship
monitor
JEL classification L26 . K22 . D810
1 Introduction
"Holland, the most unpolite country in the world,
uses debtors with mildness and malefactors with
rigour; England, on the other hand, shows mercy
to murderers and robbers, but of poor debtors
impossibilities are demanded." Samuel Byrom,
Manchester Times 22 October 1862
The importance of formal institutions in shaping incen-
tives and behaviour is now widely accepted. In particular,
it has been recognised that the institutional environment is
a crucial factor affecting entrepreneurship (e.g. Baumol
1990; Busenitz et al. 2000; Levie et al. 2014). Previous
researchers have stressed the role of both ‘higher order’
institutions (e.g. constitutional protection of property
rights) and of government regulations (e.g. Djankov et al.
2002; Klapper et al. 2006; van Stel et al. 2007; McMullen
et al. 2008; Bowen and De Clercq 2008; Sobel 2008;
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Levie and Autio 2011; Troilo 2011; Aidis et al. 2012;
Estrin et al. 2013, 2016). We posit that bankruptcy proce-
dures are a feature of a nation’s institutional environment at
the regulatory level and have special significance for entre-
preneurship (Dally 1994; McGrath 1999; Lee et al. 2007).
Legal arrangements for bankruptcy are critical for
entrepreneurship as they form ‘the rules of the end game’
(Lee et al. 2011, p. 519); that is the mechanisms to deal
with business failure. Entrepreneurship is risky with low
survival rates (Audretsch 1991; Mata and Portugal 1994;
Geroski 1995; Gimeno et al. 1997). Although firm closure
does not necessarily mean that the business has failed,
business failure is a common outcome of entrepreneur-
ship (Headd 2003; Wennberg et al. 2010) and also one
about which potential entrepreneurs are especially con-
cerned when making entry decisions (Dew et al. 2009).
In previous literature, researchers theorise that coun-
tries where bankruptcy laws are more debtor friendly, i.e.
are more forgiving towards debtors in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, are likely to havemore entrepreneurs (Lee et al.
2007, 2011; Armour and Cumming 2008; Peng et al.
2010). This is because entrepreneurship theory empha-
sises the role of entrepreneurs in creating value by taking
risks in innovating, investing and launching new ventures
(e.g. Foss and Klein 2012). Debtor-friendly regimes are
seen to reduce the downside risks to failure and thus
make entering entrepreneurship more attractive (Lee
et al. 2007, 2011; Armour and Cumming 2008; Peng
et al. 2010). However, the overall effect on entrepreneur-
ship is ambiguous because debtor-friendly bankruptcy
regimes take rights away from creditors, unlike more
creditor-friendly bankruptcy law that encourages the pro-
vision of finance and may thereby relax financing con-
straints for entrepreneurs (Shleifer and Vishny 1997;
Djankov et al. 2007). Indeed, Lee et al. (2011) and Lee
and Yamakawa (2012) find that only some elements of
debtor-friendly corporate bankruptcy law are positively
linked to new firm entry rates. Yet they do not offer an
explanation as to why certain elements of bankruptcy law
do encourage entrepreneurship while others do not. This
is our opening research question.
We add to the literature in three ways. First, by
offering a theory-based rationalisation and empirical
test, we aim to resolve the ambiguity of the effect of
bankruptcy law identified above. We use prospect theo-
ry to offer an explanation as to which elements of
bankruptcy law will be salient to entrepreneurs and
which ones less so, when potential entrepreneurs evalu-
ate their risks at the point of entry.
Second, we provide empirical analysis of the effects
of both personal and corporate bankruptcy law. Until
now, empirical studies of the relationship between bank-
ruptcy law and entrepreneurship have focused on either
personal or on corporate bankruptcy law but not both
together and there has been a debate on the relevance of
the latter to entrepreneurs (Cumming 2012; Lee and
Yamakawa 2012).
Third, we extend previous studies by distinguishing
between high-growth aspiration entrepreneurs and those
entrepreneurs who aspire only to create jobs for
themselves or their families. As Henrekson and
Sanandaji (2014) and Levine and Rubinstein (2013)
have stressed, more ambitious forms of entrepreneurial
activities, which are central to innovation, growth and
development, are not well measured by generic indica-
tors of self-employment or new firms creation; thus, the
distinction between the aspiration levels is important
(see also: Wong et al. 2005; Henrekson and Johansson
2010; Levie and Autio 2011; Estrin et al. 2013). As
recently demonstrated by Stephan et al. (2015), ambi-
tion and growth aspirations are the most important fac-
tors for business success. Previous literature on the
impact of bankruptcy regulations has ignored the dis-
tinctions between the levels of aspiration; we argue this
distinction is important because the influence of bank-
ruptcy procedures will vary according to growth
aspirations.
We derive hypotheses based on prospect theory of
how elements of country-specific regulatory arrange-
ments concerning personal and corporate bankruptcy
law affect the likelihood of individuals starting a new
venture. We test our hypotheses using data from the
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor combined with data
on personal and corporate bankruptcy regulations for 15
developed OECD countries. We apply multilevel ran-
dom coefficient logistic regressions which take into
account the hierarchical nature of the data (country and
individual levels).
We find that both personal and corporate bankruptcy
law affect entrepreneurs: whilst personal bankruptcy
law influences a broad range of entrepreneurs, corporate
bankruptcy law impacts on ambitious entrepreneurs. We
argue that prospect theory helps to explain which ele-
ments of bankruptcy law will influence the prevalence
of entrepreneurship. This allows us to derive important
recommendations about the optimum design of bank-
ruptcy law. We argue that because creditors and
entrepreneurs attach different significance to
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different elements of bankruptcy law, scope is left
for improvement in the legal framework. In this
way, we also contribute to the classic law and
economics literature, probably best represented in
the context of bankruptcy by Posner (2007).
2 Prospect theory—a lens to understand how
entrepreneurs view the downside risks
of bankruptcy
Expected utility theory is the standard approach to
decision-making under uncertainty (Arrow 1971).
However, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have argued
that this model does not capture the behaviour that we
actually observe. In expected utility theory, alternative
choices are evaluated according to the sum of the returns
under different outcomes, each weighted by the proba-
bility of that outcome taking place. Yet, this view of
decision-making under uncertainty does not account for
the way that people’s choices are influenced by all sorts
of cognitive biases. For example, in expected utility
theory, the utility of gaining US$50 is equivalent to the
loss of utility from losing US$50. In experiments, this
prediction is not supported.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have developed an
alternative theory that is based more closely on observed
behaviour: prospect theory (see Tversky and Kahneman
1992 for further advances in prospect theory, also
Barberis and Thaler 2003). There are three fundamental
propositions of prospect theory which, taken together,
provide a framework which can be applied to improve
our understanding of how entrepreneurs make decisions
under uncertainty.1 The first fundamental proposition of
prospect theory is that individuals view outcomes from
decisions under uncertainty as gains or losses relative to
a reference point. Individuals are more attuned to the
evaluation of changes than of absolute magnitudes
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The reference point
usually corresponds to the status quo. This contrasts
with expected utility theory, where an outcome is eval-
uated only on the final utility position, regardless the
individual’s starting point (Kahneman and Tversky
1979).
The second fundamental proposition of prospect the-
ory is that ‘...losses loom larger than gains. The aggra-
vation that one experiences in losing a sum of money
appear to be greater than the pleasure associated with
gaining the same amount’ (Kahneman and Tversky
1979, p. 279). This again implies that the initial position
matters, as both gains and losses are evaluated with
respect to it; a phenomenon that Thaler (1980) labelled
as ‘endowment effect.’
The third key element of prospect theory is that the
value of outcomes is assessed by decision weights rather
than the probabilities used in expected utility theory.
Decision weights differ from probabilities in that they
take into account the fact that humans are bad at esti-
mating probabilities. During decision-making process-
es, individuals tend to underweigh probabilities in the
middle range and overweigh both outcomes that are
considered near certain or very unlikely. This means
that a shift in circumstances where certainty of no loss
is replaced by even a very small probability of a signifi-
cant loss may have significant impact on the subjective
evaluation and weighting of that prospect. Likewise, a
shift from a situation where some positive outcome is
deemed impossible to a situation where it becomes
possible may have large positive effect on assessment
of the prospect (Kahneman 2011).
Although prospect theory has rarely been used hith-
erto for the theory of entrepreneurship, it is of particular
relevance as it provides an empirically based framework
to analyse how individuals make decisions in uncertain
and risky situations (Parker 2009; Wennberg et al.
2010). For entrepreneurs, the taking of risks and a high
likelihood of failure is inherent: ‘if the manager takes no
risks… this individual is no longer an entrepreneur’
(Knight 2009 [1921], p. 21). Applying prospect theory
in the case of an entrepreneur starting a new venture, we
posit that the reference point corresponds to the entre-
preneur’s position at time of venture creation. Empirical
evidence indicates that entrepreneurs do pay attention to
reference points when making start-up decisions as they
decide which projects to pursue by considering whether
they can afford to bear the losses incurred if the project
fails rather than choosing those which will yield the
highest expected return as would be predicted by ex-
pected utility theory (Dew et al. 2009). Furthermore, we
argue that loss should not only be defined by financial
loss but also by restrictions on choice which would
occur for an entrepreneur with loss of decision rights
over their venture: as the theory of opportunity cost
1 A feature of prospect theorywe do not discuss in detail is diminishing
sensitivity in evaluation of potential changes in value, because this has
no direct bearings for our research questions.
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posits, any restriction of choice is equivalent to an
additional cost (Buchanan 1979). Based on this ap-
proach, gains from entrepreneurship will be judged as
any outcome that leads the entrepreneur to increase both
their wealth and their choice range relative to the point at
which they started the business and, correspondingly,
losses as related to any relative decrease.
The idea that losses are of greater significance than
gains to people making decisions under uncertainty has
also been shown to be relevant in the context of entre-
preneurial choice. When an entrepreneur is assessing
his/her returns, the potential costs that may accrue if
the enterprise fails will be weighted more heavily than
the upside gains from success. This is in contrast with
the expected utility framework, in which the gains and
losses are equally balanced. Effectuation research has
highlighted the principle of affordable loss as a heuristic
that successful entrepreneurs use when starting new
ventures (Sarasvathy 2001). Moreover, possible future
losses are more likely to be a prominent factor in the
start-up decision than the potential future upside be-
cause they may come sooner and are easier to calculate
(Dew et al. 2009). Estimating potential gains requires
assessment of future revenues, costs and risks—aspects
outside of the entrepreneur’s control and which are
likely to be highly uncertain for new ventures, and
especially for high growth ones. Losses are easier to
calculate as they are based on the individual’s current
financial position and commitment to the potential ven-
ture—about which the entrepreneur is well informed. In
line with this, empirical research demonstrates that los-
ing personal assets is the major factor when assessing
the degree of risk at time of entrepreneurial entry deci-
sion. These risks relate in particular to the possibility of
losing home ownership (Fan andWhite 2003; Levie and
Hart 2010).
Prospect theory has important implications for our
understanding of the effects of bankruptcy law on en-
trepreneurship as the evaluation of future gains and
losses probabilities will be contingent of the institutional
arrangements of the country in which the entrepreneur
operates. Legal arrangements for bankruptcy are an
important example of institutions which alter the bal-
ance of entrepreneurial gains and losses because they
govern the pay-outs to creditors and debtors in bad states
of the world when the entrepreneur becomes unable to
service its debts. Bankruptcy law can produce a partial
insurance against the costs of failure because they limit
the downside losses that an entrepreneur may face by
providing a mechanism for the debtor to discharge their
debts (White 2001; Lee et al. 2007; Posner 2007;
Armour and Cumming 2008). But the degree of that
partial insurance effect depends on detailed elements of
bankruptcy law; the harshness and the exact nature of
bankruptcy arrangements towards debtors will affect the
entrepreneur’s evaluation of bad outcomes. Hence, a
better understanding of attitudes towards risk, which is
provided by prospect theory, is critical for evaluating
which elements of bankruptcy law are likely to be more
salient in the decision to become an entrepreneur and
especially one with high aspirations. Thus, prospect
theory offers a framework for understanding why not
all debtor-friendly aspects of bankruptcy law are equally
important for potential entrepreneurs and therefore pos-
itively related to start-up activity. In the next section, we
present in more detail how those aspects of bankruptcy
systems differ.
3 Bankruptcy law
‘Bankruptcy is precipitated by debt; a firm that never
borrowed could not go bankrupt, unless burdened by
involuntary debt, such as tort judgement’ (Posner 2007,
p. 431). The bankruptcy code sets out the processes for
the debtor and creditors to follow when the debtor
becomes insolvent. It provides a collective framework
to enable the distribution of the assets of the debtor
amongst relevant stakeholders: creditors, tax authorities,
employees, and, in corporate bankruptcy, shareholders
(White 2007). Importantly, bankruptcy law provides
entrepreneurs with insurance enabling them to clear
their debts rather than being liable until they are paid
off. This limits the downside risks in case of failure (Lee
et al. 2007; Posner 2007), and therefore has a critical
impact on how entrepreneurs evaluate risks at the point
of entry.
Indebted entrepreneurs may face bankruptcy under
two distinct jurisdictions: personal bankruptcy law or
corporate bankruptcy law. Under personal bankruptcy,
the entrepreneur as an individual is personally liable for
all of the firm’s debts except for the exemptions that the
personal bankruptcy law specifies. This will occur in the
case of proprietorships, partnerships and when personal
guarantees have been tied to loans. However, if an
entrepreneur has incorporated their business,
bankruptcy takes place under corporate bankruptcy
law and all personal assets which are not linked to the
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firm are protected from creditors by limited liability.
Indeed, the protections of limited liability are the main
reason entrepreneurs decide to incorporate their firms.
Yet, as Cumming (2012) points out, creditors often
demand that entrepreneurs provide personal guarantees
which are equivalent to ‘contracting out’ of the limited
liability protection. Thus, bankrupt entrepreneurs who
own incorporated firms will often face personal as well
as corporate bankruptcy. Thus, it is important to consid-
er the effects of both types of bankruptcy law on entre-
preneurship. Moreover, they are likely to have different
effects on different types of entrepreneurs. We argue
below that while the influence of personal bankruptcy
law is likely to be wider, corporate bankruptcy has a
greater effect on more ambitious entrepreneurs.
The general conclusion from previous empirical stud-
ies of bankruptcy law is that countries that have more
debtor-friendly bankruptcy systems encourage entrepre-
neurship because these institutions reduce the downside
losses to entrepreneurs and make entry less risky (Fan
and White 2003; Armour and Cumming 2008; Peng
et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2011; Lee and Yamakawa 2012).
Yet, as has been emphasised in the law and economics
literature (La Porta et al. 1998; Djankov et al. 2007,
2008), the bankruptcy code also affects the incentives
for the supply of credit. When bankruptcy arrangements
are creditor-friendly, they incentivise debtors to repay
their debts and give the creditors greater power to recov-
er their loans in case of default. This reduces the net cost
of debt financing and increases its supply. Empirical
evidence links both the size of the credit market (La
Porta et al. 1997; Djankov et al. 2007) and credit provi-
sion to small firms (Berkowitz andWhite 2004) with the
degree to which creditor rights are protected through
stricter bankruptcy law. If, as argued by Evans and
Jovanovic (1989), entrepreneurial activity is credit
constrained, then creditor-friendly bankruptcy arrange-
ments will enhance entrepreneurial activity by relaxing
the constraints on the supply of funds (Parker 2009). The
impact of this increased supply of funds is likely to be
especially important for high-aspiration entrepreneurs
since their demand for external finance is greater and
the wider availability of finance for entrepreneurship at
the country level facilitates the growth-aspiring entre-
preneur’s ability to raise funds to expand their business.
This suggests that the individual likelihood of entrepre-
neurial entry may be positively related to elements of the
bankruptcy code that enhance the return of debt in the
case of business failure.
Previous research has considered both sides of the
debate (Lee et al. 2011), but was limited in providing
theory to help in understanding which aspects of bank-
ruptcy law matter more to entrepreneurs and which to
creditors. We propose that the elements of the bankrupt-
cy law that matter most for entrepreneurs may not be
those that matter most for creditors, and that prospect
theory is a useful framework to unpick this issue. When
starting a new venture, entrepreneurs will have invested
some resources and are likely to have full control. They
are also likely to have some personal resources and
rights, which are not related to the venture. This is the
entrepreneur’s current position. In prospect theory
terms, this is the reference point (endowment) from
which they assess the potential losses in the event of
failure. Thus, a loss for the potential entrepreneur would
be a loss of the resources invested in the firm, loss of
control of the firm and loss of other non-venture related
personal resources and control rights. The second ele-
ment of prospect theory, loss aversion, means potential
loss weighs more heavily in the mind of the potential
entrepreneur than the possible gains. Hence, the poten-
tial losses from downside risk loom larger in the deci-
sion to start a business. Elements of bankruptcy law that
will affect the entrepreneur’s decision to start a new
venture most are therefore those that relate to personal
assets of the entrepreneur and to restrictions on his/her
decision rights.
4 Hypotheses
4.1 Hypotheses: personal bankruptcy
As explained above, under personal bankruptcy law,
entrepreneurs are personally responsible for the firm’s
debts. Posner (2007) argues that the exemptions provid-
ed by personal bankruptcy law offer a type of insurance
that would be difficult to provide via the market.
Moreover, unlimited liability would imply ‘heavy cost
in supervising the collection of the bankrupt debts over
his lifetime’ (ibid., p. 436). For that reason, the law does
not allow any person to ‘waive his right to seek dis-
charge of the debt in bankruptcy’ (ibid.). On the other
hand, personal bankruptcy law that comes with no cost
to the debtor makes default an attractive option, leading
to moral hazard. This may raise the interest rate or lead
to credit rationing to compensate for the additional risk
(Berkowitz andWhite 2004). The tension between these
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two aspects implies that optimising the design of per-
sonal bankruptcy law is non-trivial.
Lawmakers typically seek a compromise in which
some costs to the debtors are balanced by some degree
of protection. In most cases, and in all advanced
economies, some form of personal bankruptcy proce-
dure is available but the degree of protection offered to
the debtor varies. In the previous literature, it has been
theorised that more debtor-friendly personal bankrupt-
cy regimes encourage more entrepreneurship (Armour
and Cumming 2008). Yet, this gives no guidance to
policy makers on which trade-offs to make. Here,
prospect theory helps, as it suggests that the elements
of personal bankruptcy law that will matter more to
potential entrepreneurs and will have more influence
on their decision to enter into entrepreneurship are
those which relate to protecting their personal assets
from downside losses. Next, we examine three ele-
ments of personal bankruptcy law: the availability of
a fresh start, exemptions, and ability to reach a com-
promise with creditors. Using prospect theory, we
propose hypotheses as to which elements are the most
salient for potential entrepreneurs.
First, the most frequently discussed aspect of person-
al bankruptcy law as regards entrepreneurship is the
availability of a ‘fresh start’, which generally allows
the debtor ‘an opportunity to begin a new and unencum-
bered financial chapter in his or her life’ (Efrat 2002, p.
82). This involves both the debt being forgiven, or
discharged, and the minimisation of other forms of
discrimination. Countries vary according to the degree
to which they allow a fresh start (Armour and Cumming
2008). At one (rare) extreme, personal bankruptcy law
does not exist or, if it does, the discharge of debts is not
available as part of the process (ibid.). At the other
extreme, where a fresh start is available, debtors are
automatically discharged of their debts after a certain
period of time. Furthermore, no other restrictions are
placed on the debtor’s civic or economic rights (Armour
and Cumming 2008; Efrat 2002). In other countries, the
discharge may be available but it is not automatic. The
debtor needs to apply to obtain discharge and even after
application, it may not be given. Additionally, in some
countries, other restrictions are imposed on the debtor’s
economic and civil rights until they are discharged from
bankruptcy (Efrat 2002). These can range from being
barred from obtaining credit, running a business, run-
ning for political office, to being incarcerated (Armour
and Cumming 2008).
Second, exemptions of personal assets from the bank-
ruptcy proceedings are also an important part of person-
al bankruptcy law (White 2007). Exemptions relate to
personal assets owned at the start of bankruptcy that can
be withheld and so, not be the subject of creditors’
claims. Exemption levels vary across countries. Under
generous bankruptcy law, the debtor’s home may be
exempt (Fan and White 2003). In most European coun-
tries, minimal exemptions apply—only tools of the trade
and personal items are exempt (Armour and Cumming
2008). Moreover, in some countries, there are negative
exemptions whereby a spouse’s assets can be pulled into
the bankruptcy proceedings (ibid.).
Third, personal bankruptcy codes differ in how dif-
ficult they make reaching a compromise with the cred-
itors whereby the debtor can agree with creditors to pay
a proportion of the face value of the debts and for the rest
to be discharged (Armour and Cumming 2008).
Compromise with creditors is useful either when auto-
matic discharge is not available or when the debtor
wishes to exit bankruptcy sooner than the automatic
discharge period. The ease of securing a compromise
depends, in particular, on whether the majority of cred-
itors is allowed to overrule the minority in reaching an
agreement with the debtor (ibid).
How significant are these three aspects for an entre-
preneur when evaluating their risks on the basis of
prospect theory? This theory leads us to expect that the
lack of a fresh start, which means the possibility of
losing pre-existing rights, both economic and civic,
including a right to start another business afresh, and
the lack of exemptions on key pre-existing assets, espe-
cially the family home, will feature high on the list of
risks when deciding whether to engage in (ambitious
forms of) entrepreneurship as these are freedoms and
assets that the entrepreneurs have at the time of starting a
business. Thus, these provisions of personal bankruptcy
law increase the perceived potential for loss compared to
the reference point, and loss aversion will discourage
individuals from starting a business.
Assuming that entrepreneurs rely on decision
weights, not actual probabilities, can explain whymove-
ment from bankruptcy systems where entrepreneurs are
protected through fresh start and exemptions and face no
probability of losing their initial rights or collateral, to
one where these protections are removed, may induce a
dramatic change in the entrepreneur’s evaluation of the
prospect to start a project. The change in probability of
losing these rights and collateral would look small when
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evaluated in terms of expected utility, but the impact on
how the entrepreneur evaluates the prospects may actu-
ally change dramatically. For example, in the USA or
UK, where collateral is often based on home ownership,
evaluations of bad outcomes may be significantly al-
tered in contexts where that home is exempted from
creditors’ claims (Fan and White 2003). On the other
hand, prospect theory leads us to expect that the poten-
tial difficulty in arriving at a compromise with creditors,
while important as a sanction for creditors, will be of
little significance to the entrepreneur at the time they are
deciding whether to start a venture or not. This is not an
element that links directly to their conditions at time of
entry (i.e., their reference point), and therefore it will be
given less weight. Based on this, we posit:
Hypothesis 1 The likelihood of an individual becoming
a high growth aspiration entrepreneur is lower in coun-
tries where the bankruptcy codes offer:
(a) No fresh start, i.e. no discharge available after
personal bankruptcy and restrictions are imposed
on debtor after bankruptcy,
(b) Fewer exemptions of personal assets from credi-
tors’ claims on the debtor.
4.2 Hypotheses: corporate bankruptcy
Corporate bankruptcy law allows distressed incorporat-
ed firms to resolve their debts and constitutes a mecha-
nism for firm’s exit in the case of business failure (White
2007). Given that corporate bankruptcy law only applies
to limited liability companies, it is unlikely that the
severity of the law will affect all entrepreneurs equally.
Self-employed entrepreneurs and those with lower
growth aspirations are less likely to register their firms
as limited liability corporations because the costs of
registering—such as having to adhere to corporate reg-
ulation and pay corporate income tax—may be greater
than the benefits (Klapper et al. 2006). In contrast,
entrepreneurs who have ambitions to grow and employ
others are much more likely to adopt the limited liability
form and therefore become affected by corporate bank-
ruptcy law, especially as to achieve high growth, they
are likely to need to take on debt. These entrepreneurs
benefit, therefore, from the greater protection from
bankruptcy provided through limited liability
(Vanacker and Manigart 2010).
Generally, corporate bankruptcy law includes two
types of procedures to deal with insolvent firms: liqui-
dation and reorganisation (La Porta et al. 1998; Armour
2001). Liquidation occurs when a firm is converted into
cash through the sale of its assets (Hart 2000; Armour
2001). In liquidation, the entrepreneur is separated from
the firm. In contrast, reorganisation allows the entrepre-
neur a second chance as an insolvent debtor company is
allowed to continue operating and is given additional
time to devise a reorganisation plan (La Porta et al.
1998). The aim of reorganisation is to aid firms in
becoming solvent again while the burden of current debt
is lifted.
Although these two procedures, liquidation and
reorganisation, are generally available in most bankrupt-
cy regimes, there is enormous variation in the specific
details of each procedure. As is the case with personal
bankruptcy, this heterogeneity is in part due to conflict-
ing objectives of the legislation: seeking to protect cred-
itor rights against preventing the liquidation of viable
firms leading to the loss of jobs (Claessens and Klapper
2005). Bankruptcy law in different countries strikes
different balances between offering guarantees to cred-
itors and creating opportunities for retaining control by
owners-managers. Our approach is to use prospect the-
ory to identify which individual components of corpo-
rate bankruptcy law will affect entrepreneurs, also pay-
ing attention to the fact that only entrepreneurs with high
levels of growth aspirations are likely to be affected. We
propose that the effect of each component of bankruptcy
law on entrepreneurs’ motivation depends on how it
addresses the alleviation of those risks which matter
most for entrepreneurs.
As a preliminary step, to identify the components of
corporate bankruptcy law, we concentrate on La Porta
et al.’s (1998) creditor rights’ index to characterise na-
tional bankruptcy regimes. Here, the power given to
creditors is assessed by the presence of four crucial
elements of creditors’ rights: priority to secured credi-
tors in the distribution of assets, a debtor’s right to
choose reorganisation, the absence of stays on secured
assets and mandatory removal of management. We will
next discuss the expected impact of these four elements.
We do not anticipate a negative impact on high-
aspirations entrepreneurship if there are restrictions on
filing for reorganisation such as requiring creditors’
consent or minimum dividends. Extant literature cate-
gorises reorganisation as a debtor-friendly process be-
cause it gives a chance for the firm to survive
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bankruptcy proceedings and for the owners to retain
control of the organisation after bankruptcy (La Porta
et al. 1998; Lee et al. 2007). Yet, by strengthening the
position of creditors, restrictions on reorganisation may
enhance the supply of credit because secured creditors
are more likely to be able to recover the value of their
loans through liquidation rather than going through the
uncertain and often lengthy reorganisation process (La
Porta et al. 1998; Prentice et al. 2003).2 At the same
time, from the perspective of prospect theory, there are
no obvious disincentive effects on high aspiration entre-
preneurs from either of these arrangements; these do not
represent the potential losses of the entrepreneur as
evaluated with respect to his/her initial position at the
time of start-up decision. Thus, we do not hypothesise
any effect of restrictions on reorganisation on high-
aspiration entrepreneurship.
We also do not expect that high-aspiration entrepre-
neurship will be negatively impacted by corporate bank-
ruptcy codes which give priority to secured creditors in
the distribution of the assets of a bankrupt firm. There is
no element of prospect theory we could use to explain
how it could affect the entrepreneurial choice at the time
of entry decision.
In contrast, we posit that the dimensions of a bank-
ruptcy code that matter for the entrepreneur are (a) no
automatic stay on secured assets and (b) requirement
concerning the removal of the incumbent management.
These two elements of bankruptcy law influence the
extent to which the entrepreneur is able to remain in
control if the firm enters into reorganisation proceed-
ings. In some countries, such as the USA, the legal
provisions for reorganisation shift the balance of power
from creditors to debtors allowing the entrepreneur to
remain in control of their firm during bankruptcy
(Pochet 2002). In others, such as the UK, this shift of
power does not occur, which limits the use of
reorganisation instead of outright liquidation. This loss
of power is important to entrepreneurs because they
strongly value control of their companies (Parker
2009) and, as we argued above, endowment in control
rights is akin to endowment in wealth. Importantly,
these decision rights are not gained with the develop-
ment of the venture but are present from the outset,
representing an initial endowment; hence, prospect
theory suggests that the risk of losing them should
feature highly in an entrepreneur’s considerations.
Where the removal of the incumbent management
during reorganisation is required, management is re-
placed by an external party. For example, in the UK,
the management must be replaced by an official admin-
istrator appointed by the secured creditors. The admin-
istrator will then run the business and prepare the
reorganisation plan. In other countries, the incumbent
management may remain in control of the firm, for
example, in the USA under Chapter 11. Brouwer
(2006) argues that ousting of management during bank-
ruptcy proceedings is a crucial factor in explaining why
fewer firms survive bankruptcy intact through
reorganisation in Europe than in the USA. Given pros-
pect theory, required removal may have an especially
strong negative impact on high-aspiration entrepreneurs
because of the loss of control it entails. Furthermore, the
automatic removal of the incumbent manager can have,
at best, modest implications for the return to creditors, as
the potential disciplining effects on entrepreneurs are
counterbalanced by the fact that their idiosyncratic
knowledge and motivation with respect to their venture
may help them to restore the viability of the company,
especially that financial distress could be caused by
unexpected temporary external shocks.
Next, in some countries, an automatic stay is also
placed on secured assets during reorganisation proceed-
ings. This prevents secured creditors from unilaterally
seizing the firm’s assets that they hold as security, thus
allowing time for the implementation of a reorganisation
plan. In most cases, the assets used for security will be
important to the running of the business, and the firm
may be therefore unable to continue in business if the
option of unilateral seizure is executed. This is likely to
have a disincentive effect on entrepreneurs: again, ac-
cording to prospect theory, an increased risk of losing
control rights over their venture should have a major
impact at the time of start-up decisions, as these control
rights are present from the beginning. Additionally, the
place of an automatic stay can have beneficial effects for
creditors as without it, the threat of other creditors uni-
laterally seizing assets may encourage creditors into a
‘race to collect’ the debts owed to them (Armour 2001).
Thus, if no automatic stay is placed on assets, the likeli-
hood of a firm surviving bankruptcy as a going concern
will be reduced and some creditors may not get anything.
Combining together an evaluation of all four character-
istics of corporate bankruptcy codes leads us to propose:
2 As long as the securities they hold cover the value of the debts owed
to them.
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Hypothesis 2 The likelihood of an individual becoming
a high-growth aspiration entrepreneur is lower in coun-
tries where the removal of incumbent management is
mandatory during the reorganisation process, and there
is no automatic stay on secured assets.
5 Methods
5.1 Data
Our data on entrepreneurial aspirations and individual
characteristics derive from the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor (GEM) adult population surveys (Reynolds
et al. 2005). We have at our disposal data from 15
OECD countries covering 450,954 individuals over
the years 1999–2005 which form a pooled, cross-sec-
tional, time series dataset; however, due to missing data
on specific variables, the actual number of observations
we use in estimations is 255,275. This time period and
the number of countries included in the sample were
chosen due to data availability as explained in the next
section. The GEM survey started in 1999 with represen-
tative samples of 1000 individuals within in each coun-
try. From 2000 onwards, the data consist of representa-
tive samples of at least 2000 individuals in each country,
although some country teams were able to finance larger
samples. GEM surveys were completed through phone
calls, and through face-to-face interviews in countries
where low density of the telephone network could create
a bias. National datasets are harmonised across all coun-
tries included in the survey. The dataset is unbalanced as
information is not available for all countries in all years.
Each year, the survey comes from a different sample of
respondents. The samples are drawn from the working
age population, which avoids the potential selectivity
bias that could affect studies which focus on existing
entrepreneurs.
Data on personal bankruptcy law are taken from
Armour and Cumming (2008). They provide a cross-
country comparison of personal bankruptcy law in 15
OECD countries. Data on corporate bankruptcy law in
each country derive fromDjankov et al. (2007) (see also
La Porta et al. 1998). They provide a cross-country
comparison of the rights of creditors to extract a return
through corporate bankruptcy proceedings. The data on
bankruptcy law are only available until 2005 which
limits the number of years available for analysis.
5.2 Dependent variables
We use a sequence of four dependent variables to mea-
sure nascent entrepreneurship. Nascent entrepreneurs
are defined by GEM as individuals between the ages
of 16 and 64 who, in the past year, have taken action
towards setting up a business that they expect to own,
but who are yet to have paid anyone wages for more
than 3 months (Bosma and Levie 2009). Our first de-
pendent variable, start-up, measures whether an indi-
vidual is engaged in starting a new business. It takes a
value of 1 for those who are in the process of starting a
business and 0 for those who are not. However, we are
particularly interested in distinguishing the effect of
bankruptcy law on high-aspiration nascent entrepre-
neurs. Following Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011), we
create a series of variables which are nested within the
start-up category and distinguish different levels of
growth aspirations. Data on growth aspirations is gath-
ered in GEM through the question ‘How many people
will be working for this business, not counting the
owners but including all exclusive subcontractors, when
it is five years old? By exclusive subcontractors, we
mean people or firms working only for this business,
and not working for others as well’ (Reynolds et al.
2005). High asp 5 is coded 1 when an individual indi-
cates that they are nascent entrepreneur who aspires to
employmore than five people in 5 years. Avalue of zero
is given to all other respondents; hence, the zero cate-
gory contains both non-nascent entrepreneurs and those
with low growth aspirations. The same logic applies to
the creation of high asp 10 and high asp 20 only in the
case for the former the nascent entrepreneur must aspire
to have 10 or more employees in 5 years and for the
latter 20 employees. Thus, these variables are nested one
inside the other, meaning, for example, that individuals
categorised as a high asp 20 entrepreneur, aspiring to
create more than 20 jobs in 5 years will also be
categorised as a high asp 10 and high asp 5 entrepreneur,
but not vice versa. Figure 1 below illustrates how the
variable was constructed. This approach is useful be-
cause we are able to utilise the whole sample so
Heckman selection models are not needed and as the
nesting of the dependent variables means that the four
equations estimated using these dependent variables do
not require simultaneous estimation.
In addition to the four regressions based on the nested
categories of start-up as described above, we alterna-
tively combined the start-up categories into one ordered
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variable. Accordingly, individuals not engaged in entre-
preneurship are coded as 0; individuals are coded as 1 if
they are engaged in nascent entrepreneurship but with
no aspirations to employ more than 5 people in 5 years;
as 2 if in the next 5 years they aspire to employ more
than 5 and up to 10 employees in; as 3 if they aspire to
employ between 10 and 20 employees and as 4 if they
aspire to employ 20 or more employees.
5.3 Explanatory variables
5.3.1 Personal bankruptcy law
Armour and Cumming (2008) have compiled measures
of the severity of personal bankruptcy law in 15 coun-
tries in Europe and North America for the years 1990 to
2005, though for consistency with the starting point of
our entrepreneurship data (GEM dataset), we will only
use the data from 1999.3 The key dimensions of person-
al bankruptcy identified by Armour and Cumming
(2008) are:
– No discharge from personal indebtedness is avail-
able after bankruptcy =1; = 0 otherwise;
– Restrictions on the debtor (disabilities) are imposed
after bankruptcy, and these restrictions may relate to
his/her civic and economic rights over the bank-
ruptcy period; the variable takes a value between 0
and 4;
– Exemptions of personal assets = 1 if debtors can
only keep modest personal items and tools and
equipment; = 0 if more generous exemptions
allowed (e.g. homestead exemptions in USA);
– Compromise with creditors difficult measures how
difficult it is for debtors to reach a compromise with
creditors to end bankruptcy proceedings.4 This
varies according to how the majority voting require-
ment is formulated regarding number of creditors
and the value of claims. The variable measures this
on continuous scale by adding the required propor-
tion of debtors to the required proportion of claims’
value, resulting in a range varying between 0 and 2.
For all variables, a higher value indicates less debtor-
friendly personal bankruptcy law. Correlations between
these four indicators are relatively low (between 7 and
24 %), with one important exception of the correlation
between restrictions on debtor and no discharge. Since
these both link to the availability of a fresh start and the
restriction debtors’ rights, it is unsurprising that they are
typically applied jointly. However, this also makes esti-
mation with both elements present difficult due to
multicollinearity. In order to address this problem, in
our estimations, we add these two dimensions together
to create a single-scale fresh start which takes values of
0 to 6 with higher values indicating more barriers to a
fresh start and a less debtor-friendly bankruptcy law. We
verified the reliability of this two-component scale reli-
ability and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was reason-
able at 0.63. This leaves us with three variables for
personal bankruptcy law: fresh start, exemptions of as-
sets, and compromise with creditors difficult.
5.3.2 Corporate bankruptcy law
The literature on corporate bankruptcy law has devel-
oped from La Porta et al.’s (1998) creditor rights index
comprising four elements in bankruptcy proceedings
that can be compared across countries and which, taken
together, shift the balance of power from debtors to
creditors. These four measures are:
Start-up: all 
nascent 
entrepreneurs
High asp 5: 
nascent 
entrepreneurs 
aspiring to create 
more than 5 jobs 
in 5 years
High asp 10: 
nascent 
entrepreneurs 
aspiring to create 
more than 10 
jobs in 5 years
High asp 20: 
nascent 
entrepreneurs 
aspiring to 
create more 
than 20 jobs in 
5 years
Fig. 1 Construction of nested dependent variables
3 The countries in our sample are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, UK, and USA. 4 This variables is called composition in Armour and Cumming (2008).
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– Secured creditors first = 1 if priority is given to
secured creditors in the distribution of the proceeds
that result from the disposition of the assets of a
bankrupt firm;
– Restrictions on reorganisation = 1 if there are re-
strictions for filing for reorganisation such as re-
quiring creditors’ consent or minimum dividends;
– No automatic stay = 1 if there is no automatic stay
on secured assets during reorganisation;
– Management goes = 1 if there is mandatory removal
of the incumbent management from control of the
firm during reorganisation proceedings.
The creditor rights index, which has been widely
used in the empirical literature, is constructed by aggre-
gating and equally weighting these four components of
a country’s corporate bankruptcy law into a simple
index (e.g. La Porta et al. 1998; Djankov et al. 2007,
2008). The more of these rules are present in a country,
the more the bankruptcy law is regarded as creditor-
friendly, and the less as debtor-friendly (Djankov et al.
2007, 2008; Lee et al. 2007, 2011; Peng et al. 2010;
Cirmizi et al. 2011). Giving power to creditors has been
seen in this literature as being unfriendly to entrepre-
neurs since it increases the downside risks for entrepre-
neurs as failure is likely to lead to harsher consequences
for the entrepreneur (Lee et al. 2007, 2011; Peng et al.
2010).
Although the credi tor r ights index is a
pioneering measure of bankruptcy law across coun-
tries, we doubt if it is always appropriate to aggre-
gate the individual bankruptcy rules. Indeed, most
of the correlations between the four elements of
bankruptcy law are very low, ranging from virtually
zero to 12 %. Cronbach’s Alpha for the four items
is 0.48, which does not support the construction of
the single index. Other research also suggests that
the complexities of corporate bankruptcy law are
not accurately captured by the single index.
Claessens and Klapper (2005) find no associations
between the use of corporate bankruptcy law across
countries and the index, while there are significant
associations when they disaggregate the index into
its components. As we argued in the hypothesis
section above, not all elements of bankruptcy law
matter equally to entrepreneurs. Therefore, we
follow Claessens and Klapper (2005) in disaggre-
gating the La Porta et al. (1998) index into its
constituent parts. One important exception we
made, however, is due to the high correlation of
0.67 between the two dimensions that we identified
as most related to the issue of entrepreneurial con-
trol: management goes and no automatic stay on
assets.
To address this multicollinearity, we merge no auto-
matic stay on assets and management goes. Cronbach’s
alpha scale reliability coefficient for this combined mea-
sure is high at 0.90. We use the three resulting variables
(two individual index components and a scale combin-
ing the two other components) to represent corporate
bankruptcy regulations in our regression analysis. As
with personal bankruptcy code elements, for all vari-
ables, a higher value indicates a less debtor-friendly
bankruptcy law.
Bankruptcy variables are available until 2005
(Djankov et al. 2007), while entrepreneurship variables
from GEM are available from after 1999, so these two
time points define the period over which we can estimate.
For compatibility we use the same 15 countries as for
personal bankruptcy estimations. See Table 1 below for a
summary of each country’s bankruptcy law over time.
5.4 Control variables
5.4.1 Individual level: sociodemographic
characteristics
We include standard individual level controls for
sociodemographic characteristics such as gender, age,
work status at time of the start-up, education, and in-
come in all models as they have been shown to be
significantly related to entrepreneurial entry and aspira-
tions (Parker 2009; Reynolds 2010; Estrin and
Mickiewicz 2011; Aidis et al. 2012). Gender (female)
is coded 1 for females. Age is included with age2 as an
inverted U-shaped relationship with entrepreneurial en-
try has been previously identified (e.g. Levesque and
Minniti 2006). Education is controlled for by two dum-
my variables: secondary education indicates whether an
individual has completed secondary education (coded as
1) and higher education, which indicates whether an
individual has completed higher education (also coded
as 1). The third educational category is omitted bench-
mark, it represents primary education. We also include
six GEM categories representing work status (see
Table 2 below), with full employment representing
benchmark. In addition, in line with studies cited above,
we add business angel dummy, which represents an
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individual involved in financing entrepreneurial projects
in the last 3 years and we use as an indication of wealth.
Head of household income is available from GEM data
categorised into low, middle, and high, based on per-
centiles of distribution, and we take the lowest income
category as omitted benchmark. Taken jointly, we use
all the individual control variables that have full cover-
age in GEM for our period of interest that is from 1999.
5.4.2 Country level: macroeconomic and institutional
environment
We use two controls at the country level to account for
financial dimensions of the country environment. First,
we wish to control for availability of credit, and there-
fore, we include the size of domestic credit to the private
sector as a percentage of GDP (private sector credit/
GDP) to control for the level of financial development
and in particular of banking sector development (e.g.
Djankov et al. 2007). These data come from the World
Bank World Development Indicators and are lagged by
1 year to alleviate possible endogeneity. Second, we
include the minimum capital requirements for an entre-
preneur to form a limited liability company, as these
affect the type of organisational form entrepreneurs will
choose and also the debt strategies of the start-ups.
Armour and Cumming (2008) find that they negatively
affect self-employment levels in Europe. Likewise, as
the capital requirements represent an additional entry
cost for limited liability ventures, previous research
suggests that they may dampen incorporation rates
(Djankov et al. 2002; Klapper et al. 2006). The measure
(in Euros) is taken from Armour and Cumming (2008).
Again, we lag it by 1 year. Whilst in previous work, the
level of economic development and the security of
property rights have been found to be important explan-
atory variables for country-level entrepreneurship (e.g.
Wennekers et al. 2005; Estrin et al. 2013), we are using
data only from advanced economies which are relatively
uniform in terms of higher-order institutions and level of
GDP per capita. We therefore do not consider these
controls to be necessary for this particular sample. See
Table 2 below for descriptive statistics of our dependent
and control variables.
Table 1 Summary of bankruptcy law measures
Personal bankruptcy law Corporate bankruptcy law
Country Years Fresh start
(no discharge
+ restrictions)
Exemptions
on personal
assets
Compromise
with creditors
difficult
Secured
creditors
first
Restrictions
on
reorganisation
No automatic
stay and
management
goes
USA 1999–2005 1 0 1 1 0 0
Greece 2003–2005 4 1 1.46 0 1 0
Netherlands 2002–2005 0 2 1 1 0 2
Belgium 2000–2005 3 1 1 1 0 1
France 2000–2005 2.5 2 0 0 0 0
Spain 2002–2004 4 1 1.1 0 0 2
2005 0.5 1
Italy 1999–2005 4 1 1.16 0 1 1
Austria 2005 0 2 1.25 1 1 1
UK 2000–2005 2 1 1 1 1 2
Denmark 1999–2005 3.5 1 1.4 1 0 2
Sweden 2000–2005 3 1 2 1 0 0
Germany 1999 4 0 1.25 1 0 2
2000–2005 1 1
Canada 1999–2005 2 0 1.16 1 0 0
Ireland 2001 and 2003 2 1 1 1 0 0
Finland 2000 and 2004 3 1 0.8 1 0 0
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5.5 Model specification
Due to the hierarchical nature of the data, the regressions
are estimated using multilevel random coefficient logis-
tic regression: individuals (level 1) are clustered in
country-year samples (level 2). This means that an indi-
vidual in the same country-year cluster has more similar
characteristics to other individuals within the same clus-
ter than to individuals in a different one. This implies
lack of independence in the error term. If we were to use
traditional regression techniques, then the standard errors
would likely be biased, which could lead us to drawing
incorrect conclusions from the models (Bliese 2002).
The issue of dependency between observations in the
same country-year cluster can be corrected by using
country-year fixed effects and clustered standard errors.
However, this would prevent the inclusion of level 2
variables such as corporate bankruptcy law—the focus
of this study—as they vary very little over time (Snijders
and Bosker 2012). Moreover, our questions are
multilevel: we are interested in the relationship of vari-
ables at different levels: the influence of bankruptcy law
(a country level variable) on an individual’s likelihood of
being a high-aspiration nascent entrepreneur (an individ-
ual level variable). Thus we use a multilevel model.
We use logistic regression as our dependent variable
is dichotomous.5 Logistic regression estimates the prob-
ability that an individual will be a high-aspiration na-
scent entrepreneur. Estimation by logit is our preferred
choice because we face a small proportion of observa-
tions in high-aspiration category compared to the rest of
the working age population and it can be proved analyt-
ically that logit coefficients are not affected by such a
skewed distribution (e.g. Maddala 2001). The models
are estimated on the sample of 307,136 observations
within 74 country-year clusters, based on the availability
of all variables.
First, we estimate the between-country-year variance
in the dependent var iab le (h igh-aspi ra t ion
entrepreneurship) with no independent variables or con-
trols (step 1). Second, we estimate a baseline equation
by adding individual level controls and country-year
level controls to the model (step 2). This results in our
baseline model which is represented by combining
Eqs. 1 and 2 below. Equation 1 represents the relation-
ship between individual level variables and entrepre-
neurship. In these equations, πij represents the probabil-
ity of an individual i starting a business in country-year
j, Γ represents a vector of individual level coefficients
and eij represents the individual-level error term. Note
the subscript j in the coefficient of β0j in Eq. 1. This
indicates that the intercept is treated as random coeffi-
cient and is allowed to vary across country-years, i.e.
level 2 variables are related to high aspiration entrepre-
neurship. Hence, the need to specify Eq. 2 which indi-
cates that the intercept is a function of vector of pmacro-
controls, Z0p, and a country-year level error term U0j.
Third, we include the bankruptcy law variables to fur-
ther explain how high aspiration entrepreneurship is
related to level 2 factors (step 3). The estimated models
presented in Table 3 are represented by combining
Eqs. 1 and 3. Equation 3 indicates that the model’s
intercept β0j is influenced by γ01, which represents the
5 We considered using multinomial logit, but the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption is clearly violated as the choice
of being a low-growth nascent entrepreneur is much more similar to
that of being a high-growth nascent entrepreneur than to not being an
entrepreneur at all.
Table 2 Table of descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Min Max SD
Start-up 0.03 0 1 0.16
High asp 5 0.01 0 1 0.12
High asp 10 0.01 0 1 0.10
High asp 20 0.01 0 1 0.08
Female 0.53 0 1 0.50
Age 40.99 14 65 13.44
Age squared 1861.15 196 4225 1110.09
Secondary education 0.34 0 1 0.47
Higher education 0.36 0 1 0.48
Full time employment 0.59 0 1 0.49
Part-time employment 0.09 0 1 0.29
Retired or disabled 0.06 0 1 0.24
Homemaker 0.06 0 1 0.24
Student 0.04 0 1 0.20
Not working, other 0.13 0 1 0.34
Occupational status not
given
0.02 0 1 0.16
Business angel last 3 years 0.02 0 1 0.16
Head of household:
middle income
0.34 0 1 0.47
Head of household: high
income
0.25 0 1 0.43
Private sector credit/GDP 118.36 34.87 191.20 31.75
Minimum capital
requirements
8.22 0 35 9.25
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effect of bankruptcy codes on high aspiration
entrepreneurship.
log
πij
1−πij
 
¼ β0 j þ Γ individual level controlsð Þij
þ eij ð1Þ
β0 j ¼ γ00 þ Z0p macro level controlsð Þ þ U0 j ð2Þ
6 Results
Results are reported in Table 3 below. All models in
Table 3 include both personal and corporate bankruptcy
indicators. We verified that entering them separately
made little difference to the results. We present five
separate models, four representing the four nested de-
pendent variables (dummies) corresponding to the level
of entrepreneurial growth aspirations defined by number
of jobs to be created and the fifth, an alternative where
we treat the different types of start-ups defined by level
of aspirations as categories of one ordered variable, and
estimate the random effects ordered logit model.
Ordered logit models have been used in the literature
(e.g. seminal paper by Reuer and Arino 2007), but the
multilevel version we apply is little used.
Models 2–4 of Table 3 contain our core results for the
dependent variable, high aspiration entrepreneurship,
upon which we base our tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2.
They report the results for step 3 discussed in the previ-
ous section; that is, including the three personal bank-
ruptcy indicators, three corporate bankruptcy indicators
and the control variables. Model 1 is the same except
that it has a general measure of start-up; it is presented
for the sake of transparency and plays no role in our
hypotheses testing. It is provided for comparison, to
show the same specifications for nascent entrepreneur-
ship in general without reference to growth aspiration
level (see discussion below). As a result, model 1 in-
cludes the same independent variables as models 2 to 4.
As already mentioned, model 5 use the same set of
explanatory variables, except that this time, we combine
all categories of entry into one ordered dependent vari-
able. While the model is included as a robustness check,
it is a less exact match of our hypotheses, as these relate
to likelihood of high growth aspiration entry, yet random
effects ordered logit coefficients also rely on differences
in level of aspirations; an interesting but slightly differ-
ent question than the one we hypothesised.
We report odds ratios (i.e. exponentiated coefficients)
for ease of interpretation. The reported values corre-
spond to the factors by which the odds of an individual
becoming a nascent entrepreneur change for a unit
change in the explanatory variable, holding all other
variables constant (Long 1997).6 We tested the suitabil-
ity of using a multilevel random intercept model on our
data. As indicated above, we estimated first a null model
with no coefficients (step 1) and carried out likelihood
ratio tests which confirmed that a multilevel random
intercept model is a more suitable model than a single
level one (p < 0.001). The residual interclass correlation
(IC)—the degree of unexplained variance at the
country-year level—was 8.4 % for start-ups in general
(start-up) and 10.7 % for high aspiration nascent entre-
preneurs expecting to have more than 20 employees in
5 years’ time (high asp 20). Interestingly, the higher
unexplained variance for high aspiration nascent entre-
preneurs indicates that country-year characteristics are
more important for them than for nascent entrepreneurs
in general. We then included all the individual and
macro level controls; as a result, 4.9 % of country-year
variance was left unexplained for start-up and 9.3 % for
high asp 20. Finally, including both personal and cor-
porate bankruptcy law makes a difference: it reduces the
intra-class correlation to 1.6 % for start-up and 2.2 % for
high asp 20.
With respect to personal bankruptcy law, we find
very strong support for Hypotheses 1a and b. That is,
the elements we highlighted, lack of a fresh start with
restrictions on rights of debtors and lack of protection of
their personal assets, are associated with a lower likeli-
hood of being engaged in a start-up and of high aspira-
tions entrepreneurship in particular. The other compo-
nent of the personal bankruptcy law, difficulty in
reaching a compromise with creditors, has no effect on
6 An odds ratio less than 1 indicates a negative relationship between
the independent and dependent variables and an odds ratio greater than
1 indicates a positive relationship.
(3)
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Table 3 Estimation results—random intercept logistic regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Start-up:
Low asp.
High asp
5+ jobs
High asp
10+ jobs
High asp
20 +
Ordered
model
Elements of personal bankruptcy codes
Fresh start 0.822*** 0.825*** 0.834*** 0.804*** 0.822***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.053) (0.035)
Exemptions of personal assets 0.544*** 0.527*** 0.517*** 0.472*** 0.543***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.046) (0.037)
Compromise with creditors difficult 1.076 1.016 0.928 0.974 1.073
(0.124) (0.121) (0.121) (0.169) (0.123)
Elements of corporate bankruptcy codes
Secured creditors first 0.573*** 0.586*** 0.686** 0.617* 0.574***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.099) (0.121) (0.078)
Restrictions on reorganisation 0.979 1.250* 1.499*** 1.738*** 0.983
(0.101) (0.124) (0.158) (0.245) (0.101)
No automatic stay and management goes 1.001 0.921 0.864** 0.856* 1.001
(0.051) (0.046) (0.046) (0.061) (0.050)
Individual-level control variables
Female 0.480*** 0.422*** 0.429*** 0.474*** 0.479***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) (0.013)
Age 1.093*** 1.062*** 1.071*** 1.066*** 1.092***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007)
Age squared 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Secondary educationa 0.862*** 0.872*** 0.856*** 0.869*** 0.863***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027) (0.014)
Higher education 1.159*** 1.147*** 1.169*** 1.151*** 1.159***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.030) (0.036) (0.018)
Business angel last 3 years 1.402*** 1.387*** 1.386*** 1.362*** 1.404***
(0.029) (0.034) (0.037) (0.042) (0.029)
Part-time employmentb 1.300*** 1.116 1.146 1.151 1.295***
(0.060) (0.075) (0.091) (0.111) (0.060)
Retired or disabled 0.614*** 0.544*** 0.567*** 0.537*** 0.614***
(0.051) (0.065) (0.081) (0.093) (0.051)
Homemaker 0.539*** 0.431*** 0.490*** 0.458*** 0.539***
(0.053) (0.070) (0.091) (0.104) (0.053)
Student 0.438*** 0.505*** 0.588** 0.576** 0.439***
(0.049) (0.073) (0.098) (0.119) (0.049)
Not working, other 0.934 0.846** 0.846* 0.824* 0.932
(0.042) (0.052) (0.061) (0.071) (0.042)
Occupational status not given 0.973 1.010 0.877 1.148 0.974
(0.128) (0.168) (0.182) (0.258) (0.129)
Middle incomec 1.101** 1.119* 1.108 1.093 1.102**
(0.036) (0.052) (0.062) (0.073) (0.036)
High income 1.255*** 1.459*** 1.476*** 1.379*** 1.261***
(0.043) (0.069) (0.083) (0.093) (0.043)
Country-level control variables
Minimum capital requirements 0.985** 1.000 1.010 1.016 0.986*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Prospect theory and the effects of bankruptcy
entrepreneurial aspirations, consistent with prospect
theory.
Next, considering the direct effects of corporate
bankruptcy law on high-aspiration entrepreneurship,
presented in models 2 to 4 in Table 3, we find that our
scale that combines no automatic stay and management
goes is significant for high-aspiration entrepreneurship
when defined by either 10 jobs or more, or 20 jobs or
more. It is not significant for the level of aspirations
defined by five jobs and for general start-up model
(models 1 to 4). While the results are slightly weaker
than for personal bankruptcy, the pattern is consistent
with Hypothesis 2.
We also find restrictions on reorganisation to be
significant in all the high aspiration entrepreneurship
models 1–4. While prospect theory suggests these
should be less relevant to the entrepreneur at time of
making entry decision, they should be highly relevant to
creditors. If so, this would enhance the supply of credit
and provide support especially to higher aspirations
entrepreneurs, which is what we find.
Finally, for secured creditors first, the coefficient is
significant in all reported models where we have per-
sonal and corporate indicators jointly. However, unlike
previous cases, this significance is likely to be caused by
the pattern of multicollinearity between personal and
corporate bankruptcy indicators, because in models
where we entered either the set of personal bankruptcy
indicators or the set of corporate bankruptcy indicators
separately, the indicators were no longer significant (not
reported). Therefore, we have less faith in this result.
There is an interesting difference in patterns of
results for personal versus corporate bankruptcy var-
iables. For personal bankruptcy indicators, we see
similar level of significance for our general start-up
dependent variable and for our high-aspirations en-
try dependent variables. However, in contrast, for
corporate bankruptcy, the no automatic stay and
management goes scale displays a pattern in which
the results are not significant for start-up and for
start-ups with 5 or more jobs expected, but clearly
significant for the most ambitious forms of
Table 3 (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Start-up:
Low asp.
High asp
5+ jobs
High asp
10+ jobs
High asp
20 +
Ordered
model
Private sector credit/GDP 1.001 1.001 1.002 1.001 1.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.045*** 0.037*** 0.019*** 0.012***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006)
Cutpoint 1 (start-up) 21.788***
(7.223)
Cutpoint 2 (start-up, aspirations: 5 jobs) 43.030***
(14.273)
Cutpoint 3 (start-up, aspirations: 10 jobs) 61.617***
(20.449)
Cutpoint 4 (start-up, aspirations: 20 jobs) 90.999***
(30.226)
Log of random effect’s S.D. −2.96*** −3.27*** −3.32*** −2.60***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.026)
Log likelihood −28,684 −17,006 −12,774 −9342 −37,013
Wald Chi squared 2653 1794 1366 839.8 2667
Estimated residual S.D. of random effect 0.229 0.194 0.189 0.272 0.227
Estimated intra-country residual correlation 0.0157 0.0113 0.0107 0.0219
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; Exponentiated coefficients; exponentiated standard errors in parentheses; Observations: 255,275;
Country year groups: 64; Year dummies included in all regressions but not reported
a The benchmark omitted category for education is primary education or less.
b The benchmark omitted category for work status is full time employment.
c The benchmark omitted category for head of household income is low (being in the lowest 1/3 of income distribution)
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entrepreneurship. That makes sense: it is typically
only for larger-size projects that the entrepreneurs
consider incorporation, and therefore the features of
corporate bankruptcy law become relevant.
The models in Table 3 are also consistent with the
literature regarding the control variables. At the individ-
ual level, male, educated and middle-aged individuals
are more likely to be high-aspiration entrepreneurs.
Wealthier individuals (proxied by whether they have
been a business angel in the last 3 years) and those with
high income are more likely to be entrepreneurs across
all categories of aspirations. Additionally, employed
individuals (our base category) are more likely to be
entrepreneurs than retired, disabled, students, home-
makers and individuals who are not working. The effect
size increases as the scale of aspiration increases.
At the country level, the size of the domestic credit
market to GDP is not significant. It becomes statistically
significant only when personal bankruptcy laws are not
included in the models (not reported). The elements of
bankruptcy law exhibit moderate correlations with the
size of the credit market (the highest one is −32 % with
our composite measure of no discharge and restrictions
on debtors); these seem to cause some multicollinearity.
At the same time, (unexpected) negative signs of those
correlations suggest that stringency of the personal
bankruptcy law has no positive impact on the overall
supply of credit, again consistent with our focus on
entrepreneurs and not on creditors.
Higher minimal capital requirements have an ambig-
uous impact. The results indicate a strong negative
impact on our general measure of start-up, but not on
more ambitious forms of entrepreneurship. This is intu-
itive: those entrepreneurs who have more ambitious
plans need more capital and therefore are not affected
by the threshold levels of regulations. This is an inter-
esting finding as it suggests that although minimum
capital requirements may discourage entrepreneurial en-
try in general, they do not discourage themost ambitious
entrepreneurs.
7 Discussion
Previous research has highlighted that the impact of the
bankruptcy code on entrepreneurship is composed of
two effects. On the one hand, rules giving creditors more
power may increase the likelihood of an individual
becoming an entrepreneur. This is an indirect effect
caused by an increase in the supply of finance resulting
from a more creditor friendly environment (La Porta
et al. 1998; Djankov et al. 2007) and of particular
importance when entrepreneurs are financially
constrained. On the other hand, some elements of the
code act to reduce the likelihood of an individual choos-
ing to become a high-growth entrepreneur, because of
their effects on the expected outcomes following finan-
cial distress (Armour and Cumming 2008; Lee et al.
2007, 2011; Peng et al. 2010). In previous research,
there has been ambiguity as to which of the two effects
will dominate (Lee et al. 2011; Lee and Yamakawa
2012). We suggest that prospect theory offers a theoret-
ical explanation when focusing on potential entrepre-
neurs, who are characterised by loss aversion when
comparing the potential gains and losses to their wealth
and control at the point of venture creation. The effects
that matter most for entrepreneurs are those that relate to
their assets and decision rights at the time of entry. In
this context, prospect theory led us to generate unam-
biguous hypotheses about the negative effects on high-
aspiration entrepreneurship of bankruptcy law when:
there is no fresh start with no discharge after personal
bankruptcy and restrictions are imposed on the debtor,
there are fewer exemptions of personal assets from the
creditors’ claims on the debtor in personal bankruptcy,
there no automatic stay on assets and where managers
are removed during corporate bankruptcy proceedings.
Our empirical work has established evidence
supporting these hypotheses. We find that those ele-
ments of personal and corporate bankruptcy law that
have a statistically significant and negative impact on
entry into high aspiration entrepreneurship are those
elements that leave debtors with less protection for
assets and decision rights during and after bankruptcy.
In the case of rights, these relate not only to control over
the new venture but to other economic and civic rights
that the (potential) entrepreneur has at the time of start-
up decision. For the elements of the bankruptcy code
listed above, the direct disincentive effect on high aspi-
ration entrepreneurs seems to be more than compensat-
ing for any indirect effects via the supply of finance.
In contrast, the results related to the conditions on
reaching a compromise between the creditors and the
debtors are ambiguous as here creditors’ incentives
counterbalance the effect of a milder bankruptcy regime
on entrepreneurs. Furthermore, it seems that enhancing
creditors’ rights in reorganisation so that so that their
consent and rights to dividends play an essential role in
Prospect theory and the effects of bankruptcy
reorganisation decisions, results in higher prevalence of
high growth aspiration projects (restrictions on
reorganisation in corporate bankruptcy law), presum-
ably via the indirect effects enhancing the supply of
credit. Prospect theory offers a possible explanation as
the removal of the ability for the entrepreneur to unilat-
erally decide whether to enter reorganisation or liquida-
tion bankruptcy does not relate to potential losses for
entrepreneur as evaluated with respect to his/her posi-
tion at the time of start-up. Thus, the disincentive effects
of a more penal bankruptcy system that are less directly
associated with the issue of managerial control, are more
than offset by the impact of the increase in the supply of
finance resulting from a more creditor friendly financial
environment. As a result, this study adds to the literature
on bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship.
It is also the first to analyse the effects of both personal
and corporate bankruptcy law at the same time, and to
distinguish between different aspirations levels of entre-
preneurs. This allows our findings to contribute to the
debate on the relevance of corporate bankruptcy law to
entrepreneurship (Cumming 2012; Lee and Yamakawa
2012) by showing that both personal bankruptcy law and
corporate bankruptcy law influence high impact entrepre-
neurship. Interestingly, when we pitch the elements of
corporate bankruptcy law against the elements of person-
al bankruptcy law in model 4 for highest aspiration
entrepreneurs, the clear winner is the protection of per-
sonal assets. Likewise, comparing betweenmodels 1 to 4,
we see how the negative impact of no or few exemptions
on personal assets steadily increases as we move to more
ambitious forms of entrepreneurship. Even a small risk of
losing their home seems critical for high aspiration entre-
preneurs. It is important to draw attention to these differ-
ences as these results add to the growing body of evidence
that shows that the effects of institutions may vary depend-
ing on the level of aspirations and highlights the impor-
tance of distinguishing between more and less ambitious
forms of entrepreneurship (Levie and Autio 2011; Estrin
et al. 2013).
8 Conclusions
Taken together, all our results support the proposition
that was our departure point: the ambiguity about the
direction of the effect of bankruptcy law on entry into
high-aspiration entrepreneurship can be explained
through the use of prospect theory. Prospect theory
explains why certain elements of bankruptcy law are
more salient to entrepreneurs than others. Thus, rather
than seeing all elements of bankruptcy law that give
power to debtors as entrepreneur friendly, we conclude
that the optimum design of bankruptcy law should take
into account that creditors care about different elements
of the bankruptcy process than do entrepreneurs.
It is the application of prospect theory that helped us
to understand why. We therefore make a case for its
being an important tool that can help us to explain
patterns in entrepreneurship. The impact of bankruptcy
regimes is just one element of risks faced by the entre-
preneur, and accordingly prospect theory may have
much wider implications for entrepreneurship research.
There are a number of limitations of our study. Many
of these relate to the data which we have at our disposal.
While the indicators of creditor rights introduced by La
Porta et al. (1998) represent a major advance in terms of
cross country measurement of the harshness of the
bankruptcy code, our results also support the arguments
of Claessens and Klapper (2005) that these measures do
not adequately capture the complexities of corporate
bankruptcy law. Moreover, there is limited variation of
the indicators over the time period for which GEM data
matching the creditor rights indices are available.
Similar limitations relate to personal bankruptcy codes.
Future research would doubtlessly benefit from the de-
velopment of more sophisticated and finely grained
measures of bankruptcy codes, and from analysis over
a longer period of time in order to establish the hypoth-
eses more firmly and to address more deeply potential
issues of causality and endogeneity.
Another consideration is that corporate or personal
bankruptcy law is likely to have less impact on entre-
preneurial behaviour in developing countries where the
bulk of new firm entry is in the informal sector and is not
registered. However, focusing on the most developed
countries makes us confident that the problem is less
serious for our sample.
Finally, we focus exclusively on formal institutions
and do not control for culture. Unlike bankruptcy regu-
lations that do change in some countries over a period of
time, we consider culture to be a slow-moving dimen-
sion. Therefore, the small number of countries we have
in our sample becomes a serious problem in estimations,
if we include culture as it is the cross-section not the
time dimension that matters. At the same time, some
aspects of culture, such as uncertainty avoidance
(Wennekers et al. 2007; Li and Zahra 2012; Hayton
S. Estrin et al.
and Cacciotti 2013) may be critical for high-aspiration
entrepreneurship (see also Gartner and Liao 2012; De
Clercq et al. 2014; Simmons et al. 2014). Individualism
versus collectivism could be another relevant cultural
control (Pinillos and Reyes 2011) as it may affect both
entrepreneurial attitudes and concepts of responsibility
inherent in bankruptcy law.7 With more data, one could
even think about two equations models, where culture
affects the design of bankruptcy law, which in turn
affects entrepreneurs’ choice. Yet, another fruitful path
to account for the impact of culture on bankruptcy
regulations is to move beyond quantitative studies and
to adopt historical methods, an approach that is success-
fully applied by Martin (2005).
Finally, our analysis has some important policy im-
plications. The results suggest that financial institutions,
in particular the harshness of the bankruptcy code, play
a complex role in encouraging entrepreneurship. Thus,
policy makers may be able to design bankruptcy law in a
way that simultaneously favours creditors without ex-
cessively demotivating potential entrepreneurs. The ev-
idence indicates that some elements of a harsh bank-
ruptcy regime do deter some individuals from becoming
entrepreneurs and in particular high aspiration entrepre-
neurs. Whilst corporate bankruptcy law does not impact
on low-aspiration entrepreneurs, policy makers who
wish to encourage high-aspiration entrepreneurs should
pay close attention to it. In corporate bankruptcy law,
limitations in the bankruptcy proceedings on the entre-
preneurs’ control over the firm, such as an automatic
stay on secured assets and mandatory removal of the
management, are associated with lower likelihood of
individuals entering high-aspiration entrepreneurship
which suggests that such provisions should be avoided.
However, some elements of creditor-friendly corporate
bankruptcy law such as restrictions on reorganisation
have a positive relationship to high-growth aspiration
entrepreneurship. With this element of corporate bank-
ruptcy law, it appears that the discouraging effect of
creditor-friendly rules that disempower debtors is offset
by a positive effect via the supply of finance. This
suggests that the limitation of the supply of credit re-
mains one of the constraints on high aspiration entre-
preneurship, and it is therefore likely to affect economic
growth, innovations and jobs. Thus whilst many debtor-
friendly aspects of bankruptcy law do encourage high
aspiration entrepreneurship, this conclusion cannot be
applied to all elements of bankruptcy law—in some
cases protecting creditors rather than debtors is a better
policy.
Acknowledgments We are indebted to our anonymous re-
viewers, Moren Lévesque, Philipp Koellinger, Svetlana
Makarova, Mirjam Van Praag, Mike Wright for comments and
criticism. Any remaining errors are our own.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestrict-
ed use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if
changes were made.
References
Aidis, R., Estrin, E., & Mickiewicz, T. (2012). Size matters:
entrepreneurial entry and government. Small Business
Economics, 39(1), 119–139.
Armour, J. (2001). The law & economics of corporate insolvency:
a review. In ESRC Centre for business research working
paper 62. Cambridge: University of Cambridge.
Armour, J., & Cumming, D. (2008). Bankruptcy law and entre-
preneurship. American Law and Economics Review, 10(2),
303–350.
Arrow, K. (1971). Essays in the theory of risk bearing. Chicago:
Markham.
Audretsch, D. (1991). New-firm survival and the technological re-
gime. The Review of Economics and Statistics., 73(3), 441–450.
Barberis, N., & Thaler, R. (2003). Survey of behavioral finance,
handbook of the economics of finance. New York: Elsevier.
Baumol, W. (1990). Entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive and
destructive. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), 893–921.
Berkowitz, J., &White, M. J. (2004). Bankruptcy and small firms’
access to credit. RAND Journal of Economics, 35(Spring),
69–84.
Bliese, P. D. (2002). Multilevel random coefficient modelling in
organizational research. In F. Drasgow & N. Schmitt (Eds.),
Measuring and analyzing behavior in organizations: ad-
vances in measurement and data analysis. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Bosma, N., & Levie, J. (2009). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
2009 executive report: Global Entrepreneurship Research
Association.
Bowen, H. P., & De Clercq, D. (2008). Institutional context and
the allocation of entrepreneurial effort. Journal of
International Business Studies, 39, 747–767.
Brouwer, M. (2006). Reorganization in US and European bank-
ruptcy law. European Journal of Law and Economics, 22(1),
5–20.
Buchanan, J. M. (1979). Cost and choice: an inquiry in economic
theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
7 Here, we are indebted to the anonymous referee for discussion and
suggestions.
Prospect theory and the effects of bankruptcy
Busenitz, L. W., Gómez, C., & Spencer, J. W. (2000). Country
institutional profiles: unlocking entrepreneurial phenomenon.
Academy of Management Journal, 43(5), 994–1003.
Cirmizi, E., Klapper, L., & Uttamchandani, M. (2011). The chal-
lenges of bankruptcy reform. The World Bank Research
Observer, 27(2), 185–203.
Claessens, S., & Klapper, L. F. (2005). Bankruptcy around the
world: explanations of its relative use. American Law and
Economics Review, 7(1), 253–283.
Cumming, D. J. (2012). Measuring the effect of bankruptcy laws
on entrepreneurship across countries. The Journal of
Entrepreneurial Finance, 16(1), 80–86.
Dally, C. (1994). Bankruptcy in strategic studies: past and prom-
ise. Journal of Management, 20(2), 263–295.
De Clercq, D., Lim, D. S., & Oh, C. H. (2014). Hierarchy and
conservatism in the contributions of resources to entrepre-
neurial activity. Small Business Economics, 42(3), 507–522.
Dew, N., Sarasathy, S., Read, S., & Wiltbank, R. (2009).
Affordable loss: behavioral economic aspects of the plunge
decision. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 3(2), 105–126.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A.
(2002). The regulation of entry. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 117(1), 1–37.
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2007). Private credit in
129 countries. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(2), 299–
329.
Djankov, S., Hart, O., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2008). Debt
enforcement around the world. Journal of Political Economy,
116(6), 1105–1149.
Efrat, R. (2002). Global trends in personal bankruptcy. American
Bankruptcy Law Journal, 76(1), 81–110.
Estrin, S., & Mickiewicz, T. (2011). Institutions and female entre-
preneurship. Small Business Economics, 37(4), 397–415.
Estrin, S., Korosteleva, J., & Mickiewicz, T. (2013). Which insti-
tutions encourage entrepreneurial growth aspirations?
Journal of Business Venturing, 28(4), 564–580.
Estrin, S., Mickiewicz, T., & Stephan, U. (2016). Human capital in
social and commercial entrepreneurship. Journal of Business
Venturing, 31(4), 449–467.
Evans, D. S., & Jovanovic, B. (1989). An estimated model of
entrepreneurial choice under liquidity constraints. Journal of
Political Economy, 97(4), 808–827.
Fan, W., &White, M. J. (2003). Personal bankruptcy and the level
of entrepreneurial activity. Journal of Law and Economics,
46(2), 543–567.
Foss, N., & Klein, P. (2012). Organizing entrepreneurial judg-
ment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gartner, W., & Liao, J. (2012). The effects of perceptions of risk,
environmental uncertainty, and growth aspirations on new
venture creation success. Small Business Economics, 39(3),
703–712.
Geroski, P. A. (1995). What do we know about entry?
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13(4),
421–440.
Gimeno, J., Folta, T., Cooper, A., & Woo, C. (1997). Survival of
the fittest? Human entrepreneurial capital and the persistence
of firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(4), 750–783.
Hart, O. (2000). Different approaches to bankruptcy. Harvard
Institute of Economic research paper. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University.
Hayton, J. C., & Cacciotti, G. (2013). Is there an entrepreneurial
culture? A review of empirical research. Entrepreneurship &
Regional Development, 25(9–10), 708–731.
Headd, B. (2003). Redefining business success: distinguishing
between closure and failure. Small Business Economics,
21(1), 51–61.
Henrekson, M., & Johansson, D. (2010). Gazelles as job creators:
a survey and interpretation of the evidence. Small Business
Economics, 35(2), 227–244.
Henrekson, M., & Sanandaji, T., (2014). Small business activity
does not measure entrepreneurship, Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the USA, http://www.
pnas.org/content/early/2014/01/15/1307204111.abstract
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. London: Penguin
Books.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis
of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.
Klapper, L. F., Laeven, L., & Rajan, R. (2006). Entry regulation as
a barrier to entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial
Economics, 86(3), 591–629.
Knight, F. H. (2009). Risk, uncertainty and profit. Kissimmee, FL:
Signalman Publishing.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
(1997). Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of
Finance 52(July) 1131–1150.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
(1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy,
106(6), 1113–1155.
Lee, S.-H., & Yamakawa, Y. (2012). Forgiving features for failed
entrepreneurs vs. cost of financing in bankruptcies.
Management International Review, 52(1), 49–79.
Lee, S.-H., Peng, M. W., & Barney, J. B. (2007). Bankruptcy law
& entrepreneurship development: a real options perspective.
Academy of Management Review, 32(1), 257–272.
Lee, S.-H., Yamakawa, Y., Peng, M. W., & Barney, J. B. (2011).
How do bankruptcy laws affect entrepreneurship develop-
ment around the world? Journal of Business Venturing,
26(5), 505–520.
Levesque, M., & Minniti, M. (2006). The effect of aging on
entrepreneurial behaviour. Journal of Business Venturing,
21(2), 177–194.
Levie, J., & Autio, E. (2011). Regulatory burden, rule of law and
entry of strategic entrepreneurs: an international panel study.
Journal of Management Studies, 48(6), 1392–1419.
Levie, J., & Hart, M. (2010). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor.
United Kingdom 2009 Monitoring Report. Strathclyde
University and Aston Business School.
Levie, J., Autio, E., Acs, Z., & Hart, M. (2014). Global entrepre-
neurship and institutions: an introduction. Small Business
Economics, 42(3), 437–444.
Levine, R., & Rubinstein, Y., (2013). Smart and illicit: who
becomes an entrepreneur and does it pay? http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2314667
Li, Y., & Zahra, S. A. (2012). Formal institutions, culture, and
venture capital activity: a cross-country analysis. Journal of
Business Venturing, 27(1), 95–111.
Long, J. S. (1997). Regression models for categorical and limited
dependent variables. Thousand Oaks: SAGE publications.
Maddala, G. S. (2001). Introduction to econometrics. Chichester:
Willey.
S. Estrin et al.
Martin, N. (2005). The role of history and culture in developing
bankruptcy and insolvency systems: the perils of legal trans-
plantation. Boston College International and Comparative
Law Review, 28(2), 1–77.
Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (1994). Life duration of new firms. Journal
of Industrial Economics., 42(3), 227–245.
McGrath, R. G. (1999). Falling forwards: real option reasoning
and entrepreneurial failure. Academy ofManagement Review,
24(1), 13–30.
McMullen, J., Bagby, D., & Palich, L. (2008). Economic freedom
and the motivation to engage in entrepreneurial action.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32(5), 875–895.
Parker, S. C. (2009). The economics of entrepreneurship.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peng, M. W., Yamakawa, Y., & Lee, S. H. (2010). Bankruptcy
laws and entrepreneur friendliness. Entrepreneurship Theory
and Practice, 34(3), 517–530.
Pinillos, M. J., & Reyes, L. (2011). Relationship between individ-
ualist–collectivist culture and entrepreneurial activity: evi-
dence from global entrepreneurship monitor data. Small
Business Economics, 37(1), 23–37.
Pochet, C. (2002). Institutional complementarities within corporate
governance systems: a comparative study of bankruptcy rules.
Journal of Management and Governance, 6(4), 343–381.
Posner, R. (2007). Economic analysis of law. New York: Aspen.
Prentice, D., Oditah, F., & Segal, N. (2003). Administration: part II
of the insolvency act 1986. In J. S. Ziegel (Ed.), Current
developments in international and comparative corporate
insolvency law (2nd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reuer, J. J., & Arino, A. (2007). Strategic alliance contracts:
dimensions and determinants of contractual complexity.
Strategic Management Journal, 28(3), 313–330.
Reynolds, P. D. (2010). New firm creation: a global assessment of
national, contextual, and individual factors. Foundations and
Trends in Entrepreneurship, 6(5–6), 315–496.
Reynolds, P., Bosma, N., Autio, E., Hunt, S., De Bono, N.,
Servais, I., Lopez-Garcia, P., & Chin, N. (2005). Global
entrepreneurship monitor: data collection design and imple-
mentation 1998–2003. Small Business Economics, 24(3),
205–231.
Sarasvathy, S. (2001). Causation and effectuation: toward a theo-
retical shift from economic inevitability to entrepreneurial
contingency. Academy of Management Review, 26(1), 243–
263.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). A survey of corporate gover-
nance. Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737–783.
Simmons, S. A., Wiklund, J., & Levie, J. (2014). Stigma and
business failure: implications for entrepreneurs’ career
choices. Small Business Economics, 42(3), 485–505.
Snijders, T. A. B., & Bosker, R. J. (2012).Multilevel analysis: an
introduction to basic and advanced multilevel modeling (2nd
ed.). London: Sage.
Sobel, R. (2008). Testing baumol: institutional quality and the
productivity of entrepreneurship. Journal of Business
Venturing, 23(6), 641–655.
Stephan, U., Hart, M., Mickiewicz, T., & Drews, C. C. (2015).
Understanding motivations for entrepreneurship. BIS
Research Paper No. 212.
Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1(1), 39–60.
Troilo, M. (2011). Legal institutions and high-growth aspiration
entrepreneurship. Economic Systems, 35(2), 158–175.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect
theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323.
van Stel, A., Storey, D., & Thurik, R. (2007). The effect of
business regulations on nascent and young business entre-
preneurship. Small Business Economics, 28(2–3), 171–186.
Vanacker, T., & Manigart, S. (2010). Pecking order and debt
capacity considerations for high growth companies seeking
financing. Small Business Economics, 35(1), 53–69.
Wennberg, K., Wiklund, J., DeTienne, D. R., & Cardon, M. S.
(2010). Reconceptualizing entrepreneurial exit: divergent ex-
it routes and their drivers. Journal of Business Venturing,
25(4), 362–375.
Wennekers, S., van Stel, A., Thurik, R., & Reynolds, P. (2005).
Nascent entrepreneurship and level of economic develop-
ment. Small Business Economics, 24(3), 293–309.
Wennekers, S., Thurik, R., van Stel, A., & Noorderhaven, N.
(2007). Uncertainty avoidance and the rate of business own-
ership across 21 OECD countries, 1976–2004. Journal of
Evolutionary Economics, 17(2), 133–160.
White, M. J. (2001). Bankruptcy procedures in countries under-
going financial crises. In S. Claessens, S. Djankov, & A.
Mody (Eds.), Resolution of financial distress: an internation-
al perspective on the design of bankruptcy laws: 25–45.
Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
White, M. J. (2007). Bankruptcy law. In M. A. Polinsky & S.
Shavell (Eds.), Handbook of law and economics (Vol. 2, pp.
1016–1072). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Wong, P. K., Ho, Y. P., & Autio, E. (2005). Entrepreneurship,
innovation and economic growth: evidence from GEM data.
Small Business Economics, 24(3), 193–203.
Prospect theory and the effects of bankruptcy
